Instead, Kinkaid would be forced to send his message through the radio station at Manus. In reality, Leyte Gulf was a series of naval . 83 on 4 August 1944. The first sign of trouble came at 0637, when Fanshaw Bay (CVE-70) intercepted a Japanese transmission. They were not intended for engaging surface forces, but, rather, to support convoy and amphibious operations, with their aircraft being used primarily to hunt submarines and provide air cover.96While this made them the perfect vessels to support the Leyte landings, they were hardly equipped to fight a major surface engagement on their own. Here was the peak of every naval mans fighting mans ambitiona major surface engagement! Although MacArthur publicly backed Halsey and forbade his staff from openly criticizing the admiral, raw feelings still abounded as evidenced by the fact that Sutherland handwrote this account on the bottom of the congratulatory telegram MacArthur sent to Halsey on 29 October. The fleet actions are examined to determine the operational failures and to validate current operational principles. As Lieutenant Robert Hagen recalled, We felt like David without a slingshot.103Nonetheless, she unleashed a furious barrage of nearly 200 rounds from her 5-inch battery, followed by a spread of ten torpedoes. Despite efforts from both their screening vessels and aircraft, the escort carriers did not escape their pursuers unscathed. This would greatly complicate the already difficult task of coordinating the two fleets, as the radio station proved unable to cope with the sheer number of messages that would flow through it during the battle. To be certain, there was still very little chance that the tin cans of Taffy 3 could have survived had Kurita truly wished to press his advantage. Now, out of the fight, her crew and those of the other sunk vessels would wage a different kind of battle, trying to stay afloat until they could be rescued. Carrier strikes on Okinawa and Formosa in early October were instrumental in reducing Japanese air capabilities prior to the Battle of Leyte Gulf . While they publicly exuded confidence, those involved in the operation privately knew it was a desperate gambit, with Ozawa admitting to Allied interrogators after the war that he did not have much confidence in being a lure, but there was no other way than to try.6Others were even more fatalistic, including Kurita. Despite the significant loss of Musashi and cruiser Myoko, as well as the earlier losses he had sustained off Palawan, Kurita still retained a formidable force of 22 ships (four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and ten destroyers). On the latter account, he succeeded, as planes from TG 38.3 finally discovered the Northern Force at 1640.39 Having finally found his quarry, Halsey had to decide whether to pursue them or maintain station in the Sibuyan Sea in the event that the Center Force returned. 117 For more on this, see Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagis testimony in Interrogation Nav No. His stated reason was that he was concerned that enemy aircraft appeared to concentrate on Tacloban and the disposition of the U.S. Navy ships within the gulf was unknown. There, it would languish for over two hours.98This delay would prove costly, for by the time Halsey responded, Kinkaid and Seventh Fleet had clearly established that TF 34 was not, in fact, guarding the strait. This battle was a naval operation of an incomparable scale, the outcome of which turned on innumerable individual acts of heroism; a showcase for naval air power, which also featured the last engagement between battleships; and an unparalleled victory that came perilously close to becoming an unmitigated disaster. These raids succeeded beyond all expectations, not only forcing the Japanese to partially activate Sh-1 and Sh-2 plans, but to also sortie their shore-based aircraft against Halseys forces. Their crews collective and individual heroism continue to serve as a reminders that, for all their complexity, for all the planning they involve, and for all the resources they demand, battles are still fought and won by the bravery, tenacity, the heroism, and the sacrifices made by sailors such as Ernest Evans (who posthumously received the Medal of Honor) and Paul H. Carr. The issues are not only the differences to be settled between two ships or even between the two countries concerned. The Japanese had failed to achieve their objectives while the . Regardless of Nishimuras intentions and expectations, Oldendorf was not about to give him any quarter. Commander in Chief U.S. Navy/CNO Ernest J. 50 Oldendorf and Daniel, As Seen from the Bridge, 186. Mike Cheek, his intelligence officer, told Moulton, Theyre coming through [the San Bernardino Strait], I know, Ive played poker with them.Unable to convince Moulton, he took the matter to Halseys chief of staff, Rear Admiral Robert Carney, hoping to persuade him to wake the admiral. Delivered in plain language, Kinkaid alerted Halsey that, Enemy BB and cruiser reported firing on TU 77.4.3 from 15 miles astern.84Shortly thereafter, he sent another dispatch, stating, Urgently need fast BBs Leyte Gulf at once.Several more requests of this nature followed over the course next hour and a half, much to Halseys aggravation. 8-44 and that any restrictions imposed by covering the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Forces were unavoidable.74 MacArthur also admonished Hasley that, The basic plan for this operation in which for the first time I have moved beyond my own land-based air cover was predicated upon full support by the Third Fleet; such cover being expedited by every possible measure, but until accomplished our mass of shipping is subject to enemy air and surface raiding during this critical period; consider your mission to cover this operation is essential and paramount.75None of this seems to have made a deep impression on Halsey. In certain respects, few naval battles of World War IIdemonstrate just how profoundly air power had reshaped naval warfare than Sibuyan Sea. Although Halsey would adapt very well to the many technological and doctrinal shifts that had subsequently occurred (he had even earned his naval aviation wings), at heart he was still very much a traditionalist, eager to take direct command of any situation and to engage the enemy aggressively. Meanwhile, the bulk of the Seventh Fleets firepower (TG 77.2, 77.3, and DesRon 56) had been sent south to Surigao Strait, leaving the northern approach to Leyte Gulf dangerously exposed. It provides the context of the battle, most obviously in terms of Japanese . Renowned military historian, Hedley Paul Willmott, examines this decisive naval engagement in. The principle finding in examining the planning . Instead, the strait was supposed to serve as an exit for Kuritas force. I myself, I admit, after 40 years of training, was lucky to be there in command. According to General Richard Sutherland, MacArthurs chief of staff, his boss was beside himself with fury, charging Halsey with failure to execute his mission of covering the Leyte operations. Smoots enthusiasm turned to horror when he realized what was happening. It took place from 23 October to 26 October 1944, between the Allies and the Empire of Japan. 147/11/1,425 The American Sea Power Project View Issue Comments On the night of 2 December 1944, Commander John C. Zahm took three destroyers of Destroyer Division 120 into Ormoc Bay, on the northwestern edge of Leyte Island in the Philippines. Unable to secure a quick victory and already worn down by the struggles of the prior two days (including being forced to swim to escape his sinking flagship), the Japanese admiral had been pushed beyond his breaking point, not by the majestic carriers of Third Fleet or the towering battleships of TG 77.2, but by the scrappy jeep carriers and destroyers of Taffy 3. The naval operation at the Battle for Leyte Gulf is analyzed by comparing todays concept of the operational art with the command organizations, operation plans, and operational designs of the U.S. and Japanese naval forces of 1944. 22 Thomas Hughes, Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 34145. Halseys enthusiastic reaction was very much in line with his overall command style and temperament. 155, USSBS No. For them, the model of a successful officer was one who had been in the thick of the action, fighting ship-to-ship engagements with, at best, a small number of ships. 42 Quoted in Kenneth I. Friedman, Afternoon of the Rising Sun (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2001), 197. In 1959, reflecting on the Battle of Leyte Gulf from a distance of 15 years, TIME declared that the World War II engagement between the Japanese navy and U . Humiliatingly, the admiral would be forced to spend at least part of the engagement (later dubbed the Battle of Palawan Passage) treading water until he could be rescued.30, As all of this was occurring, Halsey was busy preparing his own warm welcome. What they did not learn until much later is that this fleet (dubbed the Northern Force) was the decoy force outlined in the Sh-1 plan. The ship sank in less than 15 minutes, taking 141 men to the deep with her.114 Ironically, some of her crew had predicted this fate two weeks earlier when they received word that the ships name would be changed from Midway to St. H-038-1: Battle of Leyte GulfA Synopsis. Lieutenant (j.g.) Lieutenant Commander Copeland of Samuel B. Roberts would never forget the sight of the bloody and bare-chested Evans waving to him from the fantail as Johnston undertook her final charge toward the Japanese destroyers.110In signing what Samuel Eliot Morison described as her own death warrant,111 Johnston helped to temporarily stall the Japanese offensive against the carriers. 44 Jesse B. Oldendorf and Hawthorne Daniel, As Seen from the Bridge: Glimpses along the Sea Road to Tokyo, as Seen by an Admiral Enroute. Learn More Visit NHHC Directions and Access . It is not known for certain, however, whether it was Nimitz or King who added it to Halseys orders. At 1000, just as the second striking group was beginning its run against the Northern Force, Halsey received another message, this one from none other than Chester Nimitz. 94 Thomas C. Kinkaid, Four Years of War in the Pacific. Keyes, who was visiting Hollandia at the time, told Kinkaid, Ive been here for your briefings. USS Herman (DD-532) and a destroyer escort lay a smoke screen to protect task unit TG 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3") from attacking Japanese surface ships during the Battle off Samar, 25 October 1944. Rather than conceal this from his men, he chose a different tact: complete transparency. 19 William Halsey and Joseph Bryan III, Admiral Halseys Story (New York & London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1947), 210. If all went according to plan, the Center and Southern forces would meet in Leyte Gulf and overwhelm the landing ships of Seventh Fleet.29, Despite their best efforts, the Japanese quickly lost the element of surprise when U.S. submarines Darter (SS-227) and Dace (SS-247) espied the Center Force off Palawan on 23 October. Is it any wonder that I could not quite believe that this far outmatched Jap force would really run headlong into us?50, Oldendorfs incredulity was understandable, but it must emphasized that the Southern Forces strategy was very much in line with the daring and desperation that underlay other parts of the Sh-1 plan. Later joined by planes from Taffy 1 and Taffy 2, they helped to sink Chkai and significantly damaged a number of other ships. Even knowing this, Nishimura was determined to carry his mission out at all costs, perhaps believing that his forces might either win, or at least, distract Oldendorfs squadron long enough to allow Kuritas Center Force more time and opportunity to sneak into Leyte Gulf and destroy the landing forces.51. Thus, it is not necessarily surprising the two came to have differing as perceptions as to what their respective missions were. While the outcome of the Battle of Cape Engao was, on its own, one that the Navy could rightfully take pride in, it came at the expense of Seventh Fleet and was the product of a decision that was made without consideration for the overall mission or the flexibility to adapt to the situation at hand. He went back and rewrote the dispatch he drafted to suggest leaving behind a force of battleships and one carrier task force to guard the strait. Believing it necessary to force the U.S. Navy into a decisive battle but uncertain as to where it would strike next, they developed four separate contingency plans that corresponded to potential invasion routes the Allies might take.3 Collectively known as Sh-Go (Operation Victory), each plan called for the IJN to commit the bulk of its remaining fleet to the proposed engagement in the hopes of delivering a crippling blow to its enemies. The lopsided nature of the engagement earned it the nickname, The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. Thomas J. Cutler, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 2325 October 1944 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.), 1618. Now, almost three years later, some of very same ships sunk at Pearl Harbor had returned to action and the U.S. Navy had grown exponentially, both in terms of ships and manpower. 76 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halseys Story, 221. Curiously, it was around this same time that Vice Admiral Shima received permission to also take the Second Striking Force through the Surigao Strait. No. 2Over the course of the battle, the Japanese lost two aircraft carriers and between 350 and 450 aircraft. Significance - Battle of Leyte Gulf Upon the recommendation of Fleet HQ, he would also detach a smaller force of seven ships (two battleships, one cruiser, and four destroyers) under Vice Admiral Shji Nishimura (the Southern Force) to proceed through the Sulu and Mindanao seas with the aim of approaching Leyte Gulf from the south through the Surigao Strait. Cutler, The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 6061. Once word arrived that some of Enterprises planes had come into contact with Nishimuras force, Kinkaid sent a message to Oldendorf at 1443, ordering him to Make all ready for night battle.42 Consisting of 40 ships, Oldendorfs squadron already significantly outnumbered the seven ships of the incoming Southern Force. It was, however, the culmination of journey that begun on 7 December 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and established an aura of seeming invincibility that would persist until Midway. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the greatest naval engagement in history. Finally, at Samar, the crews of Taffy 3 demonstrated that, even in an operation of Leytes scope, individual acts of heroism and sacrifice could still mean the difference between defeat and victory. I Have Returned: Planning for the Invasion of the Philippines, Strike, Repeat, Strike!: In the Skies Over Sibuyan Sea, Make All Ready for a Night Battle: Last Clash of the Battleships in Surigao Strait, Where is Task Force 34?: Decision and Indecision off Cape Engao. 3The Philippines, Formosa [Taiwan], central Japan, and northern Japan were all considered possible routes. This assessment turned out to be dangerously inaccurate, as the Center Force still had 22 ships at its disposal. 27 For a broader discussion of the battle, see Prados, Storm over Leyte, 11851. As he later confided, it was very, very unusual to intercept a message from the United States fleet and I thought perhaps they thought we could not understand English.118, Ultimately, Kurita decided to turn his ships northward back toward the San Bernardino Strait. On board Wasatch, Kinkaid watched the situation develop with mounting dread. If we start making critical analyses, its going to confuse an already hectic operation.80. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, was the biggest naval battle in modern history. According to an eyewitness, the fiery wreckage made a sizzling sound as it sank into the water, like a huge red-hot iron plunged into water.53 All of this was before Oldendorf had even brought his cruisers and battleships forward. This remained true even as naval actions in the Pacific shifted from carrier duels in open waters to support missions for land-based operations such as the invasion of the Philippines. This on its own would have been cause for concern, but Kinkaid had further compounded the problem by stationing his carrier groups at the mouth of the gulf. Manning Samuel B. Robertss last remaining 5-inch gun, he kept firing until a breech explosion destroyed it, killing or wounding nearly all of its crew. 35, USSBS No. During this action, Heerman actually went head-to-head against the battleships Yamato and Haruna, causing one of her crew to joke, What we need is a bugler to sound the charge.105Not to be outdone, Samuel B. Roberts launched a daring assault of her own against cruisers Chkai and Chikuma, firing nearly 608 of her 650 shells and even launching starshells and anti-aircraft rounds. When this failed to work, he launched nearly all of his aircraft (little more than 110 in all), both in the hopes of relieving pressure on Kuritas Center Force and attracting Halseys notice. 6Interrogation Nav. Known as crossing the T, this was exactly the sort of scenario dreamed of, studied, and plotted in War College maneuvers and never hoped to be obtained.49The Japanese had won the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 using just this sort of maneuver and now they were poised to be on the receiving end of it. Taffy 3s screening vessels were not the only ones who distinguished themselves that day. 82 Cutler, The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 17072. 110 Friedman, Afternoon of the Rising Sun, 32425. Battle of Leyte Gulf - Wikipedia As he recalled years later, I silently agreed that any effort on my part would be useless.78, During the transit northwards, planes from Independence (CVL-22) spotted navigation lights along the San Bernardino strait and possibly even Kuritas Center Force. Over two years would pass until the Allies reached their. Battle off Samar - Wikipedia 7 Masanori Ito and Roger Pineau, End of the Imperial Japanese Navy (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), 120. Philippines LeytePacific OceanPhilippine SeaLeyte Gulf After the third strike at 1435, the Japanese task force was pretty much finished, have lost or on the verge of losing two destroyers, one cruiser, and four carriers. While they were doing this, the guns of the Japanese ships roared, first targeting White Plains (CVE-66) and St. The battle was part of World War II, and happened in the seas near the Philippines island of Leyte. Operations Analysis: The Battle for Leyte Gulf - DTIC 79, USSBS No. So much of the operations success rested on a number of different variables, not the least of which was whether or not Ozawas fleet could entice the U.S. Navys covering fleet to abandon the amphibious forces. It was, to put it less poetically, a classic naval surface engagement between big-gun fleets, one which saw the combined forces of TG 77.2, 77.3, and Destroyer Squadron (DesRon) 56 absolutely decimate the Japanese Southern Force using the sort of maneuvers that could have come straight out of any war college textbook. Recognizing the futility of pressing forward, he retreated southward.59, Compared to the significant casualties they had inflicted on the Japanese, the Allied losses had been fairly minimal save for those on board Albert W. Grant (DD-649). The Battle of Leyte Gulf: WW2's Largest Naval Battle - History 17 October 1944 1 July 1945 By the summer of 1944, American forces had fought their way across the Pacific on two lines of attack to reach a point 300 miles southeast of Mindanao, the southernmost. McCampbells nine kills alone were a record for a single engagement, one that would subsequently earn him the Medal of Honor.34Despite such heroics, at least one Japanese plane did manage to get through and bomb Princeton (CVL-23) at 0938. Image: 80-G-46986 : Battle of the Sibuyan Sea,. Battle of Leyte Gulf | Facts, Casualties, & Significance Recognizing that he was at a severe disadvantage, the Japanese admiral retired westwards at 1600, both in the hopes of avoiding further damage and giving the impression that he was in full retreat. Meanwhile, on October 24th, Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura's southern forces failed to synchronize with other Japanese central forces (Vice Admirals Shima and Kurita) because of strict radio silence that had been imposed. Hoping to bolster his fatigued commanders resolve, Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, sent Kurita a message at 1800, exhorting, Trusting in Divine guidance, resume the attack.36. For the remainder of the war, this criticism would remain behind closed doors. Faced with the choice of going on the offensive against the Japanese carriers or guarding the strait against the Center Force, Halsey chose the former option, and, in doing so, exposed Seventh Fleet to a devastating attack from the Center Force. Under this arrangement, the Seventh Fleet had been placed under MacArthurs overall command (hence, its nickname MacArthurs Navy), while Third/Fifth Fleet had been under Nimitz.17Ideally, the two commands would have merged once operations converged in a single theater, but it is unlikely that either Nimitz or MacArthur would have suffered being made subordinate to the other.18Thus, the divided command structure remained in place, even as the Allies prepared for what be the largest, most complicated amphibious operation since the landings at Normandy earlier that year. 57 Commander Destroyer Squadron 56, Action-ReportBattle of SURIGAO STRAIT, 2425 October 1944, RG 38, National Archives: 7. Initially it was thought that these ships were from Third Fleet, but upon sighting pagoda masts, all involved quickly realized that they were up against large force of Japanese vessels. For them, glory was not something to be pursued, but rather, something that they would have thrust upon them. He would posthumously receive the Silver Star for his unwavering devotion to his duty.107. To further tilt the odds in their favor, Kinkaid also detached a group of torpedo boats to patrol the southern end of the strait. 26 See Ozawas testimony in Interrogation Nav No. The situation had changed considerably since that time, however. As Oldendorf recalled, It can readily be seen that the force at my disposal was enormously superior to the Southern Japanese Force. 17 For all intents and purposes, the Third and Fifth fleets were one and the same, with the designation mainly depending on who was in command. The Battle of Leyte Gulf : The Last Fleet Action - Google Books Naval Operations, World War II, 23, Box 94, Samuel Eliot Morison Papers, Naval History and Heritage Command (Washington, DC). Vice Admiral Gerald F. Bogan attempted to report this information to Halsey, but, as the admiral was resting, one of his staff brushed him off. The latter is particularly important to highlight. Had he done so, he might have received a very different set of opinions. At 0742, Sprague ordered his screen to make another torpedo attack, this one to include the smaller destroyer escorts (codenamed the little wolves). Here we were carrying the ball in the pay-off! They found their mark, setting Japanese cruiser Kumano aflame. Consequently, some very critical messages were not delivered until many hours after they had been sent, something that would significantly affect Halsey and Kinkaids decision-making.23, It must be emphasized that, at least for now, the divided command structure and communications barriers remained only potential complications for the Leyte operation, and that the invasion plan itself was quite strategically sound. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, was the largest naval battle in modern history. See Thomas Kinkaid, Review of Vol. 56 Oldendorf and Daniel, As Seen from the Bridge, 202203. It also highlights the importance of establishing clear channels of communication among forces, firm awareness of the overall strategic objectives, and creating a command culture that both permits and encourages collaboration and criticism. I understand what is going on, I know your plan, and I think the plan is a good one and it will succeed.16. 1944 First kamikaze attack of the war begins On October 25, 1944, during the Battle of the Leyte Gulf, the Japanese deploy kamikaze ("divine wind") bombers against American warships for the. At Sibuyan Sea and Surigao Strait, the U.S. Navy executed its plans to near perfection, using its superior firepower and positioning to inflict significant losses on the Japanese forces. 119 Thomas, Sea of Thunder, 310. 1. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was very significant because it destroyed the Japanese naval forces, cut off needed supplies from reaching Japan, was the first battle the Japanese used kamikaze planes, and was the largest and greatest naval battle in WWII and all of modern history. Built to go head to head with any ship afloat, the majestic battleship was nonetheless rendered impotent by the lack of air support and the repeated air attacks against it. I thought we were going to. Well be at the bottom of the ocean in two weeks!115The prediction turned out to be true, though even they could not have foreseen that their ship would have the dubious honor of being the first to be sunk by a kamikaze attack. While Halsey would maintain until the bitter end that his mission was an offensive one, he did ruefully concede at one point that, I wish that Spruance had been with Mitscher at Leyte Gulf and I had been with Mitscher in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.92On this count, he was not alone, as many among and outside Seventh Fleet held a rather similar attitude,93 particular those who had survived the fateful consequences of Halseys actions. As he recalled, Oldendorf was a very thorough and meticulous man, and one for whom I had the greatest admiration, because he left no stone unturned to be sure that all of his Commanding Officers were versed in the way he thought and how he was going to do this operation.45 Such praise stands in stark contrast to some of the criticisms leveled at Oldendorfs opponent, Vice Admiral Nishimura, whose officers later questioned his indifference at not attending the briefings,46 and the fact that his tactical conceptions were quite different from those of the other ships under his command.47, With all preparations complete, there was little else Oldendorf and his forces could do but wait. In order to throw the Japanese off-balance and keep them guessing as to where the Allies would target next, Halsey and Third Fleet staged a series of raids against Okinawa, Formosa, and Luzon. The destroyers were not finished. Historians consider the battle to be the largest naval battle of World War Two and . In an age in which fleets were regularly attacking each other from hundreds of miles away with technology undreamt of in the 18th and 19th centuries, relying on the wisdom of Horatio Nelson might seem imprudent, but in fairness to Halsey, he was not the only officer of his generation who had worshipped at the twin altars of Nelson and Mahan. The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action|eBook I have returned.. Battle of Leyte Gulf TIME. 11 CINCPOA Operation Plan 8-44, quoted in Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas during the Month of October, 1944, RG 38, National Archives, 56. The northernmost one, TF 77.4.3 (henceforth referred to by its call-sign, Taffy 3) would patrol the area east of Samar, putting its right in the path of Kuritas Center Force.95. He has all the information. While this would prove no obstacle to success initially, the divided command structure had the potential to complicate the operation, particularly if the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) decided to vigorously oppose the invasion.
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